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Abstract
The availability of secure energy resources at sustainable quantities and a⁄ordable prices is
fundamental to South Africa￿ s current objective of enhancing and sustaining its current growth
trajectory. Economic reforms, since the early 1990s, have led to the economy growing at an
average rate of almost 5% per annum. A major consequence of this strong growth is the rapid
increase in domestic demand for oil energy. With small amounts of proven oil reserves, the rise in
oil demand as an essential energy source has prompted an increasing reliance on external sources
for domestic crude oil supplies. High oil prices, the extent of proven oil reserves, instability in
major oil producing regions and the rise in ￿ oil-nationalism￿have raised serious concerns about
the security of South Africa￿ s oil supplies. In this context, a comprehensive understanding of
oil import security risks is critical as it will guide in the formulation of energy policy framework
aimed at alleviating the impact of oil import risks. This study utilises portfolio theory to provide
quantitative measures of systematic and speci￿c risks of South Africa￿ s crude oil imports over the
period 1994 to 2007. It explains the relationship between supply sources diversi￿cation and oil
energy security risks, and highlights the impact of di⁄erent crude oil import policy adjustment
strategies on the total crude oil import risk for South Africa. The results for the adjustment
strategies show that: (a) a policy of having the same quantity of oil imported every month or a
constant quantity of oil imported from the supply regions reduces both systematic and speci￿c
risks of oil import portfolio, and (b) a reduction in speci￿c risks of South Africa￿ s oil imports
can be achieved if some of the Middle Eastern supplies can be diversi￿ed to less risk regions of
Europe, North America and Russia.
JEL classi￿cation: C44, F10, G11, 013, Q40
Keywords: Oil Import Risks, Portfolio Theory, Analytical Hierarchy Process.
1 Introduction
Accounting for about 35% of global energy demand, crude oil forms the major fuel source for the
transport sector of most countries, is a signi￿cant source of energy for ￿rms in the manufacturing
sector, and is a vital raw material for a number of industries such as those in petrochemicals.
Global consumption of petroleum increased from just over 58 million barrels per day (bbl/day) in
1983 to about 85 million bbl/day by 2006. The strong growth in global oil demand is expected to
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1continue for some time with global crude consumption forecast to reach 118 million bbl/day by 2030
(Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2007). Rapid expansions in the industrial capacities of
a number of economies in Latin America (notably Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela) and high growth
rates of non-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Asian economies
(mainly India and China) has contributed substantially to global consumption of petroleum. Rising
uncertainty over when oil production will peak, ambiguity over actual estimates of world oil reserves,
and the possibility of a supply crunch due to unanticipated excess demand are factors that have ￿rmly
placed the concept of energy security on the agenda of many countries that heavily rely on crude oil
imports.
For South Africa, the current macroeconomic framework aimed at providing an enabling op-
erating environment that enhances the economy￿ s productive capacity and the ability to generate
su¢ cient levels of both domestic and foreign capital investment, is signi￿cantly dependent on the
country￿ s capacity to guarantee the supply of secure, uninterrupted and competitively priced energy
resources. The security of energy supplies takes on even more relevance when one considers that
South Africa is Africa￿ s largest consumer of primary energy and accounts for almost a quarter of
total oil consumed in the continent. With petroleum reserves along its western and southern coast-
lines estimated at a mere 16 million barrels, South Africa remains heavily reliant on large imports
of crude oil to meet its growing demand for liquid fuels (Department of Mineral and Energy (DME),
1998). Over the period 1994 to 2006, South Africa￿ s import of crude oil averaged a growth rate
of 3%, and accounted for over 55% of total oil consumed domestically. Trade data from the South
African Revenue Service (SARS) (2007) shows that South Africa￿ s supplies of crude oil imports are
dominated by a small number of countries. In 2006, 35% of South Africa￿ s crude oil imports were
sourced from Saudi Arabia, 29% from Iran, 13% from Nigeria, and about 4% from Angola. The
remaining 19% was sourced mainly from the Russian Federation, a variety of countries in Africa
(mainly Libya and Gabon) and the Middle East (mainly Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and
Oman).
Two important trends make the quanti￿cation of the risks associated with South Africa￿ s crude
oil imports necessary. First, the country￿ s demand for crude oil has increased since 1994, and due
to strong expansions in the transportation and mining sectors,1 growth in total oil consumption
has averaged an annual rate of almost 2%. Second, South Africa is highly dependent on oil import
supplies from countries located in the Middle East and Africa, two regions prone to a high degree of
geopolitical instability. Viewed within the context of increased international competition in securing
crude oil supplies and current geopolitical tensions, South Africa￿ s growing demand for oil and its
signi￿cant reliance on oil supplies from countries in these two regions raises concerns. Depletions in
the oil stock of the United States and Europe, sharp increases in demand for oil in the expanding
demand centres of India and China, growing tensions in the Middle East (as a result of the war
in Iraq and Iran￿ s nuclear aspirations) as well as potential disruptions to oil drilling operations in
Nigeria￿ s volatile Niger-Delta region are among the key factors that have added to rising concerns
regarding the capacity of South Africa to meet its oil energy demand in the event of signi￿cant
disruptions to the production and/or supply of crude oil. Given these issues, the following questions
are pertinent:
￿ What do trends in South Africa￿ s oil imports imply in terms of the country￿ s oil energy security
risks?
￿ How can the relationship between international crude oil prices and South Africa￿ s crude
imports be analysed?
￿ What is the nature of South Africa￿ s oil import risks and can they be quantitatively measured?
1The energy intensive activities in the mining sector are mainly linked to heavy industries, minerals bene￿ciation
and metals production.
2￿ Can the government adopt a diversi￿cation strategy to mitigate against oil import risks?
￿ What impact can a diversi￿cation strategy have on South Africa￿ s oil import risks, or more
speci￿cally, which strategy reduces risk by the most magnitude?
To answer these questions, this paper develops an empirical framework that examines the rela-
tionship between diversi￿cation and oil energy security risks, quanti￿es South Africa￿ s oil import risk
and provides a foundation for exploring the impacts that potential diversi￿cation strategies could
have on aggregate oil security risks. In this way, the paper makes two contributions to existing
literature on energy security risks in South Africa and Africa as a whole.
First, we address the dearth of detailed research on the concept of oil energy security for oil-
importing Sub-Saharan African nations. Most empirical studies quantifying crude oil import risks
have either focused on developed oil importing economies (see, for example, Lesbirel, 2004) or
emerging market economies in the Asia-Paci￿c region (e.g., Wu et al., 2005). To the best of our
knowledge, no published study has developed an empirical framework for quantifying the risks
associated with oil imports of an open, middle income and oil-importing African economy such as
South Africa￿ s economy. Yet, countries such as South Africa represent a unique case capable of
shedding light on how a clear assessment and understanding of energy security risks can contribute
to policy decisions on determining the appropriate role of di⁄erent energy sources within a given
energy resource portfolio.
Second, the study incorporates qualitative judgments into a risk index framework, that re￿ ect the
role/impact of suppliers￿export policy, international oil prices and geopolitical factors on oil import
risk. The empirics of the qualitative judgments are developed and examined using the analytical
hierarchical process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980; 1994). Integrating the AHP in the risk index framework,
to the full examination of risks allows for both objective and subjective assessment of diversi￿cation
strategies that could mitigate against South Africa￿ s oil import risks. In summary, the added value
of this work lies in its direct quanti￿cation of the oil import security risks associated with South
Africa￿ s crude oil imports using portfolio theory, where risks associated with the di⁄erent supply
sources are generated using AHP. We are unaware of any parallel work in South Africa, and indeed
the rest of Africa that has applied portfolio theory and the AHP in examining and quantifying oil
import risks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review on the
concept of energy security, with a speci￿c focus on South Africa￿ s oil energy security. Section 3
presents the data and methodology used to derive South Africa￿ s oil import diversi￿cation index.
Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis of South Africa￿ s oil import risks. Section 5 provides
a discourse on the impact of import strategic policy scenarios on the estimated risk index model.
Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 Literature Review and an Overview of South Africa￿ s Oil
Energy Security
The concept of energy security is relatively broad and encompasses a variety of threats to supplies
of di⁄erent energy sources (notably oil, natural gas and electricity). From the perspective of net-
energy importing countries, energy security is de￿ned as the availability of a regular supply of
energy resources at a⁄ordable prices (IEA, 2001). This allows for the analysis of the concept of
energy security in ￿ve dimensions: physical, economic, social, environmental, and time (European
Commission, 2001). The physical dimension looks at energy security in the context of potential
disruptions when an energy source is exhausted or stopped, either temporarily or permanently
(Costantini et al., 2007). Energy price volatility accounts for the economic dimension of energy
security and is largely borne out of the reaction of market players to perceptions over the direction of
energy supplies and prices. For instance, if the demand for a particular energy resource is anticipated
3to grow substantially over a period of time, the lack of investments in expanding supply infrastructure
and productive capacity of that energy resource could fuel concerns that demand will outstrip
supply. Perceptions about future shortages could trigger increased demand for the energy resource
for stockpiling purposes, thereby bidding up of the price for that energy resource.
In cases where a particular energy source forms a vital input in the production process of impor-
tant sectors of an economy, both the physical and economic aspects of energy security introduces
the social dimension of energy security. Instability or disruptions to energy supplies that result in
either product shortages or energy price shocks could result in substantial social disorder.2 Rising
awareness about the global climate and environment has, in the past two decades, led to energy
security being increasingly interwoven with climate and environmental concerns about how factors
such as accidents (oil spills, problems with nuclear reactors) and polluting emissions (greenhouse gas
emissions from the heavy use of coal and other fossil fuels) negatively impact the earth￿ s ecosystem.
The time dimension of energy security can be assessed from two perspectives, that is, the short-term
and the long-term. The former is primarily concerned with the disruptive impact of e⁄ects such
as unanticipated supply disruptions or price hikes, while the latter focuses on ensuring that the
objective of maintaining stable and consistent economic growth (and development) is enhanced by
the availability of energy supplies at sustainable quantities and a⁄ordable prices (Costantini et al.,
2007).
As the world￿ s preeminent source of energy and the most tradable fuel, crude oil dominates the
notion of energy security. The current energy security system of the world￿ s industrialised countries,
created in response to 1973 oil crises, has as its main element, the implementation of a coordinated
and collaborative approach in developing strategies to o⁄set potential major supply disruptions that
could threaten global stability and economic activities (Yergin, 2006). While the dominance of
crude oil in debates on the concept of energy security declined between the 1980s and early 1990s,
the recent surge in global crude oil demand and prices means that just as in the 1970s, crude oil
dominates renewed debates on de￿ning energy security.3 Whereas the widely used de￿nition of
oil energy security focuses on the availability of su¢ cient supplies at a⁄ordable prices, the precise
meaning of oil energy security remains ambiguous as it di⁄ers from one country to another.
For oil producing countries that generate the bulk of their income from oil exports, the concept
of energy security will emphasise the need to ensure the ￿security of demand￿ for their exports.
For oil importing countries, the new notion of energy security is underpinned by the extent of two
key factors: ￿ oil dependency￿and ￿ oil vulnerability￿ . In its broadest form, oil dependency relates
to a country￿ s￿reliance on foreign imported quantities of crude oil. The problem of dependency on
foreign oil not only varies with imported quantity, but also with the stability of the oil market, the
number of suppliers in the market, the energy intensity (measured by the quantity of oil needed per
unit of output) in the economy among other factors.
The extent of South Africa￿ s oil dependency can be measured using four main indicators: oil self-
su¢ ciency, intensity of oil use in energy consumption, energy intensity of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), and per capita oil consumption. The oil self-su¢ ciency index measures oil production (less
consumption) relative to total oil consumption. A value of -1 is indicative of a country￿ s total
reliance on imported crude while a positive value means a country is relatively self-su¢ cient in the
production of crude oil. The intensity of oil use in energy consumption measures the share of oil in
a country￿ s total primary energy consumption. A value of 1 is obtained where oil forms the only
energy source, and zero where no oil is utilised in the generation of energy. Table 1 shows that South
Africa has a relatively high level of reliance on oil imports, an indicator that the country is quite
2In the ￿rst quarter of 2008, authorities in Cameroon, Cote d￿ Ivoire, Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso and
Mozambique were confronted with a wave of often violent social unrest caused by soaring costs of fuel and staple
foods. While the African continent is a major oil producer, policymakers have warned that continued increases in the
cost of crude oil and its adverse impact on poor households (in the form of higher public transport and food prices)
pose signi￿cant threats to Africa￿ s growth, peace and security.
3The energy policy debate has also expanded and now takes into account potential disruptions to the supply of
other energy forms including electricity and fuels derived from natural gas, coal and nuclear energy.
4vulnerable to oil supply disruptions. However, a country￿ s vulnerability to oil shocks (either in the
form of higher prices or major disruptions to oil supplies) depends not only on oil-self su¢ ciency, but
also the extent to which oil is used in energy production (Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2005).
Since the 1980s, South Africa￿ s use of oil in meeting its energy demands has remained relatively
stable with its intensity of oil use in energy consumption averaging 0.2 between 1994 and 2006 (see
Table 1). For its size and population, this value is low when compared to global levels and can be
attributed to the country￿ s endowment with vast coal reserves.4
Although South Africa￿ s intensity of oil use has been stable and relatively low compared to other
middle-income countries, its energy intensity of GDP (and per capita oil consumption makes the
country one of the most energy intensive economies among middle-income oil importers (see Figures
1 and 2).
South Africa￿ s lack of signi￿cant oil reserves means that its production of natural gas and crude
oil remains very limited. Domestic demands for liquid fuels are met via supplies derived from
two sources: (a) imported crude oil, and (b) a highly developed domestic synthetic fuels industry
dominated by two ￿rms: SASOL and PetroSA.5 Signi￿cant socio-economic reforms coupled with
government￿ s commitment to modernise the economy have, since 1994, led to a period of relatively
robust growth of the South African economy. Linked to this growth is the strong increase in the
demand for oil energy, an increase re￿ ected in the growing importance of crude oil as a major energy
source and the increase in the country￿ s total consumption of crude oil. In 2006, South Africa
consumed 23.2 million tonnes of oil (approximately 505,000 bbl/d) compared to 16.7 million tonnes
in 1990 (see Figure 3).
With oil imports accounting for a relatively signi￿cant share of this consumption, South Africa￿ s
energy security risk can be viewed as being linked not only to its oil dependency, but also its oil
vulnerability. The country￿ s high dependence on the Middle East region for its oil imports raises the
prospects that the country will be adversely a⁄ected by potential oil supply shocks in that region
(see Figure 4).
With the majority of oil imports sourced from the Middle East region (notably Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Kuwait) and with Nigeria, Venezuela and Angola gradually becoming signi￿cant sources of oil
imports, South Africa faces a multiplicity of possible risk factors that could cause disruptions to its
oil imports. Amongst others, factors that pose risks to the security of oil imports include:
1. concerns about how Iran nuclear ambitions will a⁄ect its oil exports;
2. the ongoing war in Iraq and its impact on socio-political stability of the Middle East;
3. the threat of attacks on oil facilities in Nigeria￿ s Niger-Delta region; and
4. the potential e⁄ects of underinvestment if countries like Venezuela implement a full nationali-
sation of their oil sectors.
In this respect, the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at ensuring energy security
is quite di¢ cult as the uncertain interactions of the above threats creates ambiguity over the proba-
bility of disruptions occurring. While government can not completely eliminate the risks associated
with the threat of supply disruptions, it can still formulate appropriate policy measures to minimise
risks and e⁄ects associated with supply disruptions. Thus, it is recognised that a proper evaluation
of oil import risks can provide a useful analytical tool for policymakers seeking to design coherent
and e⁄ective energy security policy.
4In 2003, the intensity of oil use for the East Asian sub-region (made up of the People￿ s Republic of China, Hong
Kong, Republic of Korea, Mongolia and Chinese Taipei) was estimated at 0.31. The nations of Indonesia, Philippines,
Singapore and India which share similar economic characteristics to South Africa recorded estimates of 0.5, 0.6, 0.9
and 0.3, respectively (ADB, 2005).
5The acronyms SASOL and PetroSA respectively stand for Suid Afrikaanse Steenkool en Olie (or in English, the
South African Coal and Oil Company) and Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa Property Limited .
See the EIA￿ s Country Analysis Brief on South Africa (2007) for details about the output and technology of both
SASOL and PetroSA.
53 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
Oil statistics are often utilised for purposes of international comparisons, construction of regional
aggregates and generation of global oil balances. It is therefore vital that appropriate and com-
parable data be chosen for such analysis. Also of importance is the need to ensure that the data
is based on appropriate classi￿cation of di⁄erent fuel types, and that the use of a common unit of
measurement, derived from the application of a suitable conversion factor, is adhered to. These
factors are important for the accurate comparison and aggregation of data, and form the basis on
which sound policies relating to oil energy use can be formulated (Karbuz, 2004).
For empirical studies that have utilised quantities of traded crude oil in their analysis, barrel of
crude oil is the standard unit measure employed. For South Africa, data on the country￿ s crude oil
imports from all supply origin6 are recorded in kilograms. This implies a need for the application
of an appropriate method to convert the quantities of oil imports into barrels. The choice of such
an appropriate conversion method is made di¢ cult by two factors. First, there is the lack of global
consensus on a common convention in measuring oil. Second, the use of a generic version to relate
volume and weight based measures of oil to barrels presents problems of measurement errors (Karbuz,
2006; 2004; Mabro, 2001). To deal with these issues, we ￿rst convert kilograms of oil imports from
each origin/source, into metric tonnes. Then, using the International Table (IT) calorie of energy
unit equivalent, we convert the tonnes into barrels of oil. Finally, corresponding barrel unit prices
are calculated. As the proposed analysis requires the use of data on international prices of crude oil,
we utilise monthly price data on Brent crude oil published in the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
3.2 Diversi￿cation index method
For many energy dependent countries, the concept of diversi￿cation provides a fundamental frame-
work for ensuring energy import security and dealing with the myriad of risks associated with
possible disruptions to production and supply of key energy resources. The principle of diversi-
￿cation of energy resource supplies requires import dependent countries to rely on more than a
single producer/supplier. This allows for dependence to be spread across multiple supply sources
thereby enhancing energy security through reduced exposure to risks of disruptions in energy mar-
kets (Lesbirel, 2004). To assess the extent of South Africa￿ s oil import diversi￿cation, we apply the









where Idiv denotes the diversi￿cation index and Si is the crude oil import share of the i-th country.
However, the complex and intertwined nature of risks associated with supply of crude oil imports
requires a more rigorous investigation of risks associated with dependence, besides the use of di-
versi￿cation index. The next sections outline the application of portfolio theory to exploring the
complex nature of dependence risk.
3.3 Portfolio theory approach to analysing SA crude oil import risks
The modern portfolio theory, developed to assist investors in optimising their portfolios and price
risky assets in ￿nancial markets, if extended to examining energy import risks serves two crucial
functions: (i) as a valuable tool for analysing choices between more or less risky sources of imported
6As reported in Trade Statistics data compiled by SARS.
6crude supplies, and (ii) assisting policy and other key decision makers in their deliberations about
the relationship between diversi￿cation and crude oil import risks.
Lesbirel (2004), applying portfolio theory, distinguishes between two main types of risks asso-
ciated with disruptions to crude oil market, namely, systematic and speci￿c risks. Systematic risk
is de￿ned as the risk a⁄ecting relatively large number of suppliers and by extension, a large seg-
ment of the global market for crude oil supplies (and production). This makes it quite di¢ cult for
oil importers to formulate strategies and measures to ameliorate the e⁄ects of such risks. For this
reason, systematic risk is often referred to as non-diversi￿able risk. Typically, this risk is due to
factors such as an unanticipated surge in global demand for crude oil or the collective actions of
the major oil producing nations seeking to use oil supplies as a strategic weapon. Such factors can
result in higher import prices, and represent a risk to oil importing countries. On the other hand,
speci￿c risk (also termed unsystematic or diversi￿able risk) is associated with events or conditions
that are more speci￿c to individual or small groups of suppliers rather than the general happenings
in international crude oil market. For example, internal political strife or accidents that hinder the
productive capacity and limits the export quantity generated by a particular oil producing nation
would have implications for oil energy security of countries that rely on such a nation for its crude
imports (Wu et al. 2007; Lesbirel, 2004).
Two key insights can be gained from understanding these two types of risks. First, in cases
where events a⁄ecting oil output and its supply to world markets are speci￿c to individual producer
nations, the unlikely probability that such events will occur simultaneously implies that a strategy
of diversi￿cation would have the potential to reduce any adverse e⁄ects that might arise from ￿ uc-
tuations of both supply and prices in the oil market. Second, the systematic risk associated with
common trends and general movements in the international crude oil represent the ￿ unavoidable￿risk
that is left after adopting a diversi￿cation strategy. Thus, while diversi￿cation could help reduce
unsystematic risks, by contrast it cannot lessen risks associated with common movements in world
oil markets.7 On this basis, the relationship between diversi￿cation and oil import risks can be
empirically formulated in a set of equations.
First, using the price (per barrel) of Brent crude oil as the benchmark for traded price of oil in
global markets, the relationship between the variation in South Africa￿ s crude oil import prices and
global price of crude oil is expressed as:
PS = ￿ + ￿PB + " (2)
where PS represents the monthly (per barrel) price of South Africa￿ s crude oil imports, PB denotes
monthly prices of Brent crude oil (per barrel).￿;￿ are parameters while " represents the error term.
The parameter ￿ represents a measure of the change in the price of South Africa￿ s oil imports that
is associated with a change in world oil prices. To the extent that the parameter is indicative of
the sensitivity of oil import prices to common price responses in global oil markets, ￿ provides a
quantitative measure of systematic risk. The error term is a measure of speci￿c risk and represents
the variation in oil price imports that is unexplained by events in international oil markets. Hence, "
shows the level to which actual oil import prices deviate from predicted values derived from Equation
(2).
Next, we examine the risks of individual crude suppliers in South Africa￿ s oil import portfolio







St is the total risk (variance in crude oil import costs) of South Africa￿ s crude oil imports in
year t while ￿
2￿2
PBtis the measure for non-diversi￿able (systematic) risk. ￿2
o"t is the variance of the
error term (") which provides a measure of diversi￿able (non-systematic) risks. Finally, ￿2
PBtcaptures
7Using price changes as a measure of risk, Lesbriel (2004) provides a good theoretical outline in explaining how
diversi￿cation can reduce risks given di⁄erent co-variances between the costs of imports.
7the variance of monthly prices of Brent crude oil in year t. Using Equation (3) the systematic risks












PSt is the systematic risk of South Africa￿ s crude oil import portfolio. Xij is the crude oil
import from supply origin j in month i and ￿ is the coe¢ cient risk. The terms n and m respectively
denote the number of months and the number of countries from which South Africa sources its oil








where ￿P"t is the speci￿c risk of South Africa￿ s crude oil import portfolio. xj is the crude oil import
from supply origin j and ￿2
o"t is the speci￿c risk associated with a particular supply source. As
the import risks associated with di⁄erent supply regions are not homogenous, each will contribute
di⁄erently to South Africa￿ s overall oil import security risk. The signi￿cance of each supply source
to South Africa￿ s overall oil import risk portfolio can be estimated through incorporating a weighted
measure of the risk associated with each supply region, k, into Equation (5). If wk denotes the risk
weight associated with each supply region k, then the speci￿cation of South Africa￿ s speci￿c risk in











The risk weights wk are obtained using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). The AHP is essentially
a multi-criteria decision approach that employs pairwise comparisons to arrive at a scale of preference
among a set of alternatives (Saaty, 1980). Details on the estimation of the risk weights using the
AHP are provided in Appendix A.
South Africa￿ s relatively buoyant economic performance since 1994 has coincided with a period
of increased demand (in both domestic and international markets) for crude oil and steep increases
in the trading price of oil. As a net importer of crude oil, continued growth in South Africa￿ s oil
imports will translate into higher values in terms of both quantity imported and the import wage bill.
As oil production and reserves are dominated by relatively few countries, the growth in imports will
generate higher systematic risks for South Africa￿ s crude oil import portfolio. Equally, the greater
the quantity of imports from particular supply sources/regions, the higher the speci￿c risk will be
for the country￿ s import portfolio. These factors create substantial di¢ culties in using Equations
(4) and (6) to evaluate the impact of ￿2
PBt, ￿ and ￿2
o"t on both systematic and speci￿c risks. To
improve the evaluation of the impact of ￿2
PBt, ￿ and ￿2
o"t, we substitute the quantity of crude oil
imports from each supply region with the corresponding import share (of each supply region) in
South Africa￿ s total crude oil imports. This improvement seeks to provide an objective re￿ ection of
changes in crude oil import risks. On this basis, the systematic risk index model of South Africa￿ s












where Sij stands for the share of South Africa￿ s crude oil import from supply origin j in the i-th












8where sj is the share of South Africa￿ s crude oil imports from supply origin j in year t:
4 Empirical Results and Interpretation
4.1 Diversi￿cation Index of South Africa￿ s Crude Oil Imports
Based on Equation (1), Figure 5 shows the trend of the calculated diversi￿cation index of South
Africa￿ s oil imports between 1994 and 2007. A higher index implies more concentration (or less
diversi￿cation), i.e., South Africa￿ s oil imports are obtained from relatively few suppliers; a lower
index, the converse. The diversi￿cation index is characterised by three distinct episodes. In the
￿rst episode covering the period 1994 to 1998, the diversi￿cation index presents a downward trend.
Much of this downward trend can be attributed to the end of South Africa￿ s international isolation
following the democratic transition of 1994. This resulted in the lifting of all economic sanctions,
creating greater access to global trade. With increased participation in global trade and access
to more markets, South Africa￿ s supply origins increased from 7 in 1994 to 16 by 1998.8 This
contributed to an increase in South Africa￿ s oil imports, from 55 million barrels in 1994 to over 142
million barrels by 1998. In the second episode covering the period 1999 to 2003, the number of
supply origins declined from 12 in 1999 to just 9 by 2002. The decrease in supply sources could be
traced to a lower demand for imported oil as South Africa￿ s total oil imports fell by over 30 million
barrels when it peaked at just over 110 million barrels in 2002. This period was also marked by a
relatively high dependence in the Middle East region as the share of this region in total oil imports
by South Africa reached a high of 94.8% in 2000.
The third episode spanning the period 2003 to 2007 coincided with government￿ s implementation
of a number of macroeconomic policies aimed at bolstering economic growth and enhancing the deliv-
ery of social programmes. Policies related to deepening the country￿ s socio-economic infrastructure
have emphasised the role of secure energy supplies in advancing growth and development initiatives.
This has prompted government to pay more attention towards diversifying the sources of the coun-
try￿ s energy supplies, including crude oil imports (Department of Minerals and Energy, 2006). By
2006, crude oil imports were sourced from 17 di⁄erent countries resulting in notable reduction in
reliance on the Middle East region for oil imports. In 2000, the Middle East region accounted for
almost 95% of South Africa￿ s imports. By 2007 this share had declined to 62% as countries in Africa
(notably Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon), South America (in particular, Venezuela) and the Russian
Federation gradually became important sources of crude oil for South Africa with these three regions
accounting for 27.5%, 1% and 5% of South Africa￿ s total imports of crude oil, respectively.
The net e⁄ect of these three episodes has been the gradual decrease in South Africa￿ s oil import
diversi￿cation index with the index reaching its lowest value of 0.68 in 2007. However, the reduction
in the diversi￿cation index does not necessarily mean a lower oil import risk. Instead, the extent to
which import risk is reduced by diversi￿cation is dependent on the nature and extent of market and
political relationships between supply sources.9
8These ￿gures re￿ect South Africa￿ s major oil suppliers, where a major oil supplier is one that provides a minimum
of 50, 000 barrels of crude oil per year to South Africa.
9The case of two sole suppliers operating under two scenarios of positively and negatively co-varying import prices,
respectively, serves to illustrate this point. Where import prices co-vary in a perfectly negative manner, an increase
in the price levied by one could induce the other supplier to lower its prices in order to raise its market share or
strengthen relations with the importing country. In this instance, diversi￿cation can reduce import risks signi￿cantly.
Alternatively, the pursuance of common political and strategic goals could lead to both suppliers operating a well
organised cartel that exerts signi￿cant in￿uence on production and prices. This arrangement would cause prices of
crude oil imports to co-vary in a positive manner. In this case, diversi￿cation will increase and not reduce import risk
(Lesbirel, 2004).
94.2 South Africa￿ s Crude Oil Import Risks
4.3 Relationship between South Africa￿ s Oil Import Prices and Global
(Brent) Spot Prices
South Africa￿ s importation of crude oil follows a de￿ned government plan aimed at compensating
domestically produced oil energy sources and ensuring that the supply of oil products are not only
stable, but available throughout the country at internationally competitive and fair prices (DME,
1998). As a globally traded commodity, crude oil is subject to global prices. It follows that for a net
importing country such as South Africa, import prices will track oil prices quoted in the international
oil market. Thus, establishing the relationship between South Africa￿ s monthly crude oil imports
and the global market price (in this case, the monthly Brent spot price in US dollars) provides an
indication of the magnitude of South Africa￿ s crude oil import risk. Figure 6 tracks the trend in
monthly prices of South Africa￿ s crude oil imports and the Brent spot price. It indicates that over
the period 1994 to 2007, Brent spot prices are generally higher than South Africa￿ s crude import
prices with the exception of a sharp increase in South Africa￿ s crude oil import prices between 1996
and 1997. This could be explained by the combined e⁄ects of the Asian crises of 1996 to 1997 which
led to signi￿cant volatility in the exchange rate of the domestic currency (the Rand) and increased
imports of crude oil.
Equation (2) provides a quantitative assessment of the relationship between global oil prices
and South Africa￿ s crude oil import prices. Owing to the lag of price variations, the error term is
auto-correlative. To ensure Equation (2) is adjusted for the error￿ s autocorrelation, we apply the
Cochrane-Orcutt method, an approach that yields:
P
;
St = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿P
;
Bt + " (9)
where P
0
St = PSt￿￿PS(t￿1), P
0
Bt = PBt￿￿PB(t￿1)and ￿is the autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the error
series. With parameter estimates given in Table 2, Equation (9) becomes:
PS(t) ￿ 0:355PS(t￿1) = 0:9654(PB(t) ￿ 0:355PB(t￿1)) + 0:731 + " (10)
The parameter estimates (Table 2) show a strong positive correlation (approximately 0.97) be-
tween South Africa￿ s oil import prices and international crude oil prices. This suggests that during
periods of supply or production disruptions, the country￿ s import price can be expected to closely
track changes in international oil prices.
4.4 Calculation of South Africa￿ s Crude Oil Import Risks
Implementing the AHP, we generate the risk weights (Table 3) of the seven regions that supply
South Africa with its crude oil imports (see Appendix A for details).
Next, using the absolute values of crude oil imports and calculated risk weights (Table 3), we use
the model speci￿cations in Equations (4) and (6) to estimate both the systematic and speci￿c risks
of South Africa￿ s crude oil imports. The results as well as estimates of overall risk of South Africa￿ s
crude oil imports are shown in Table 4.
Figure 7 highlights the key trends underlying South Africa￿ s oil imports portfolio. Overall risk
of the country￿ s crude oil import portfolio displays ￿ uctuating upward trends over the period 1994
to 2007, with notable spikes in 1997 and 2004. With an average share of 62%, speci￿c risk forms
the dominant component of South Africa￿ s oil import risk, and shows sharp increases for the period
1994 to 1997. Between 1994 and 1997, South Africa￿ s crude oil imports averaged 18 million tonnes.
The largest change in the volume of imports occurred between 1994 and 1997, when oil imports
grew from 8 million tonnes to 24 million tonnes, a growth of 195%. In 1994, South Africa￿ s crude oil
imports were sourced from only two regions with Middle East accounting for 94% of the country￿ s
total oil imports. By 1997, the number of import supply sources had increased from two to six
10regions resulting in a decline in the diversi￿cation index (see Figure 5). However, South Africa
remained dependent on imports from the highly volatile markets of the Middle East (79%), Africa
(5%) and the Russian Federation (5%). Speci￿c events in major exporting countries of the Middle
East and African regions, particularly the United Nations resolution to limit Iraqi oil exports and
declaration of a force majeure at export terminals in Nigeria, contributed to a sharp increase in
speci￿c risks and the sudden enhancement of South Africa￿ s oil import portfolio in 1997.
Figure 7 also shows that compared to 2003, steep increases in both systematic and speci￿c risks
led to a signi￿cant increase in the portfolio risk of South Africa￿ s crude oil imports in 2004. The
increase in speci￿c risks during this period can be attributed to South Africa obtaining its crude oil
imports from only two sources, the Middle East (82.2%) and Africa (17.5%) regions, both of which
experienced substantial oil supply disruptions in 2004 (EIA, 2007). In an environment of rising
global demand, OPEC￿ s implementation of production cuts and the weather induced disruptions to
oil production in the Gulf of Mexico drove increases in the average price of Brent crude oil ￿from
$28 per barrel of oil (/bbl) in 2003 to over $38/bbl in 2004. For South Africa, global trends in world
oil prices that prevailed during this period translated into a larger variation in average import prices
(from 6.39 in 2003 to 33.25 in 2004). Year 2005 had the highest monthly price variation of 83.83,
with imports prices ranging from around $39/bbl in February to $68/bbl in September. Thus, high
import prices and greater variations in import prices help explain the high values in the speci￿c and
systematic risks in 1997 and the period 2004 to 2005.
The use of large squared absolute values of crude oil imports in the calculation of risks has the
e⁄ect of overshadowing the impact of ￿ uctuations in international crude oil prices and change in
oil import supply sources on the overall import risks of South Africa￿ s import portfolio. To clearly
demonstrate the e⁄ects of these factors, we calculate the risk index of South Africa￿ s oil import
portfolio based on improved measures speci￿ed in Equations (7) and (8), respectively.
Figure 8 indicates that from 1994 to 2007, the systematic risk index of South Africa￿ s oil import
portfolio was consistently higher than the speci￿c risk index. Three distinct phases underpin the
trend in the systematic risk index: the sharp increase in 1999, a declining trend between 1999 and
2003, and the sharp peak of the index in 2005.
The sharp increase in systematic risk between 1998 and 1999 is evidence of the signi￿cant in-
creases in international crude oil prices, the impacts of which are not easily avoidable. In an e⁄ort to
raise oil prices, which fell sharply in late 1997 and remained low through 1998 to early 1999, OPEC
and non-OPEC oil producing countries agreed to reduce oil output by a combined 2.104 million
bbl/day in early 1999. The lowering of output occurred against the backdrop of increased global
demand that was in part fuelled by the recovery of Asian economies from the ￿nancial crises of
1997/98. Together, these factors resulted in monthly Brent crude oil prices escalating from $10/bbl
in February 1999 to $25.5/bbl by December of the same year. This high variation of 27.59 (see Table
4) in Brent crude prices resulted in the marked increase in the systematic risk index in 1999. In
addition, despite the increase in the crude oil prices in 1999, South Africa￿ s oil imports rose from
1.32 million tonnes in January to 2.12 million tonnes in December. This 83.6% growth in imports
further contributed to the sharp increase in the systematic risk index for 1999.
The period between 1999 and 2003 was largely dominated by weak oil demand (largely over fears
that the September 2001 terrorist attacks could exacerbate the economic recession in the United
States thus adversely a⁄ecting global economic activity) and substantial increases in oil output of
OPEC countries. These events meant that world oil prices which had tripled between January 1999
and September 2000 declined sharply, averaging just over $26/bbl during the period 1999 to 2003.
While some increases in oil price occurred at the beginning of 2002 and in mid-2003, there was less
￿ uctuation in oil prices with the variation in the Brent price of crude oil averaging $8.32/bbl during
this period. South Africa￿ s imports of crude oil also declined from 19.3 million tonnes in 1999 to
17.2 million tonnes in 2003 (Table 4). Hence, a stable but declining price of oil in global markets
coupled with reductions in the volume of oil imports contributed to a lowering of the systematic
risks index for the period 2000 to 2003.
11Apart from a brief decline in 1998, the speci￿c risk index follows a fairly constant and relatively
low increasing trend with two peaks in 1997 and 2005. Despite the increase in supply sources
between 1994 and 1997 (from 2 to 6), the Middle East (with a risk weighting of 35%) and Africa
(risk weighting of 19%) accounted for over 94% of South Africa￿ s oil imports. This heavy dependence
on relatively risky regions contributed to the observed trend of a gradual increase in the speci￿c risk
index over the period 1994 to 1997. Between 2000 and 2005, the number of oil supply sources
declined to three regions with the average share of the relatively risky regions of Middle East and
Africa in total crude oil imports equal to 87 and 12%, respectively. The heavy reliance on both
regions translated into a gradual increase in the speci￿c risk index between 1999 and 2005, with
the index reaching its highest value of 3.09 in 2005. The largest variance (value of 63.7, Table 4)
in international crude oil prices was recorded in 2007. Notably, the average price of Brent crude oil
increased from $54.3/bbl in January to $77.13/bbl in September of 2007. However, the reduction
in crude oil imports (16.06 million tonnes, Table 4) and increased diversi￿cation (as supply sources
increased to 7 regions) in 2007 contributed to slightly lower systematic and speci￿c risk indices in
2007 compared to 2005.
Figure 9 shows the absence of a linear relationship between the diversi￿cation index and speci￿c
risk index for the period 1994 to 2007. This highlights the fact that e⁄orts to either reduce or avoid
speci￿c risk cannot be achieved by merely increasing the number of crude oil supply sources. Instead,
increased crude oil supply sources (diversi￿cation) will in e⁄ect only reduce speci￿c risk index and
consequently the overall portfolio risk if: (a) the right choice of supply regions is identi￿ed avoiding
economic or political alliances (for example, cartels) and (b) the import shares are well distributed
across the di⁄erent supply sources.
5 Discussion of South Africa￿ s Crude Oil Import Strategy
Since 1994, countries in the Middle East and Africa have, on average, accounted for over 94% of all
crude oil imports into South Africa. Given the geo-political and economic dynamics of these two
regions, increased reliance on oil producers located in these regions will carry some risks. In seeking
to mitigate these risks, policymakers will need to answer some key questions. In particular, how
can South Africa adjust crude oil import strategies to reduce import risk? And how much risk can
be reduced? To assist in answering these questions, we utilise the risk index model and analyse the
changes in the risk index based on four di⁄erent import strategies/scenarios as follows:
1. Assume that South Africa implements a policy of ensuring that its crude oil imports are the
same in each month in year t, and all else is constant. How might such a strategy a⁄ect the risk
index of the portfolio? The results (see Table 5) indicate that the systematic risk index would
decrease by between 0.17 and 7.89%. This explains the strong impact of high international oil
prices which raises the systematic risk and thus the high South Africa import risk portfolio.
2. Table 6 shows the changes in the speci￿c risk index if we assume crude oil imports are the
same in each region in year t and all else is constant. The results indicate that the reduction
in speci￿c risk index would range from 63.10 to 74.45% if South Africa crude oil imports were
the same in each year for the period 1994 to 2007. This implies that reducing dependence on
high risk regions and increasing supply regions has the e⁄ect of lowering South Africa￿ s crude
oil import risk.
3. Despite the Middle East having the highest risk weighting among the seven supply regions
(34.7%), it accounted for around 83% of South Africa￿ s imports of crude oil over the period 1994
to 2007. How then would the country￿ s speci￿c risk change if we transfer a given percentage of
crude oil imports from Middle East to other regions? Table 7 indicates the changes in speci￿c
risk due to transfer import strategies based on the assumption that we transfer 10% of oil
12imports obtained from the Middle East to other regions without changing the quantity of total
imports.
In general, the results (see Table 7) show that such a transfer policy would result in a decrease in
the speci￿c risk index, with the magnitude of decrease varying for each region. The largest decrease
(of between 8.88% to 9.90%) in speci￿c risk would occur if 10% of crude oil imports were transferred
to the region with the least risk weighting - Europe (see Figures 10 and 11). At the other end of the
scale, the least reduction in speci￿c risks (ranging from 6.30 to 9.43%) would occur if 10% of Middle
Eastern supplies of imports were transferred to suppliers in Africa. The results show that reductions
in speci￿c risk index will be greatest if 10% of Middle Eastern imports were to be diversi￿ed to
Europe, North America, Russia, South America and Africa, in that order. These ￿ndings indicate
that the lower the risk weight of a region, the greater is the magnitude of the reduction in speci￿c
risk if the sourcing of South Africa￿ s oil imports is diversi￿ed to that particular region.
4 Real diversi￿cation of South Africa￿ s crude imports would mean having same imports from
each supply source in every year, assuming all else is constant. If this were the case, Figure 11
shows the impact of such diversi￿cation on the speci￿c and systematic risk index of South Africa
crude import portfolio for the period 1994 to 2007. With systematic risk usually dependent on
events a⁄ecting global oil market and prices, having same or constant quantities of monthly
crude oil imports would not signi￿cantly impact the systematic risk index (see Figure 11).
6 Conclusion
Using portfolio theory, this paper develops an empirical framework that quanti￿es the security risks
associated with South Africa￿ s crude oil imports. The framework begins with the application of
portfolio theory to estimating the risks of South Africa￿ s oil imports. Given that international
energy geopolitics and policies of oil producers have a bearing on oil import supplies, this builds
on the empirical framework by utilising the AHP approach to incorporate these factors into a more
robust estimation of oil import risks. The usefulness of both portfolio theory and AHP lies in not
only providing for the explicit speci￿cation and categorisation of di⁄erent oil import risks but also,
providing a methodology for quantifying the di⁄erent types of risks and assessing how geopolitical
and other policy factors impact on such risks. The chosen methodology is used to derive index
models and analyse changes of risks under di⁄erent import strategies. This, to our knowledge, is
the ￿rst attempt at applying portfolio theory and AHP methodology in estimating and evaluating
oil import risks in the context of an African economy. The results show that episodes of rising
(decreasing) international oil prices and/or increases (reductions) in South Africa￿ s oil imports tend
to increase (lower) the systematic risks of the country￿ s oil import portfolio. The results also indicate
that while diversi￿cation of supply sources contributes to a lowering of risks, increased diversi￿cation
that increases supplies from relatively risky oil producing regions would only serve to enhance the
speci￿c risks of South Africa￿ s oil imports.
To assess the impact of diversi￿cation and imports adjustments on risk indices, the paper simu-
lates a transfer of 10% of Middle Eastern supplies of oil to other import sources and the maintenance
of a constant amount of oil imports per month and region, respectively. Two key ￿ndings emanate
from these simulations. First, a policy of having the same quantity of oil imported every month or
a constant quantity of oil imported from the 7 regions would reduce both systematic and speci￿c
risks of South Africa￿ s oil import portfolio. Second, a reduction in speci￿c risks of South Africa￿ s
oil imports can be achieved if some of the Middle Eastern supplies can be diversi￿ed to less risky
regions of Europe, North America and Russia.
The main lesson from these simulation exercises is that South Africa can lower its oil import
risks through appropriate diversi￿cation and import adjusting strategies. Reducing dependence on
countries located in regions with signi￿cant geopolitical risks can contribute to lower speci￿c risks.
13Most of South Africa￿ s imports of crude oil are carried out by private players linked to the major,
locally based energy multinationals that engage in petroleum re￿ning and marketing. To ensure low
speci￿c risks, there is a need for a strategic partnerships and cooperation between subsidiaries of
the government owned Central Energy Fund (CEF) and private ￿rms in the sourcing of crude oil.
In addition, such a framework should aim at fostering bilateral relations with less risky oil suppliers.
Ultimately, the framework should lead to a well coordinated system of acquiring oil in the future for
purposes of reducing systematic risks that could emanate from exposure to adverse price ￿ uctuations
in international oil markets.
While the analysis provides a number of interesting insights into the issue of oil energy security
for South Africa, rising demand for energy in the country￿ s transport, manufacturing, construction
and commercial sectors implies that any assessment of energy security will bene￿t from the inclusion
of all types of energy resources and supplies.
References
[1] Agiobenebo, T.J., 2000. Market Structure, Concentration Indices and Welfare Cost. University
of Botswana and University of Port-Harcourt.
[2] Albayrakoglu, M.M., 1996. Justi￿cation of New Manufacturing Technology: A Strategic Ap-
proach Using Analytical Hierarchy Process. Production and Inventory Management. Journal 37
(1), 71-77.
[3] Asian Development Bank, 2005. Asian Development Outlook: The Challenge of Higher Oil
Prices. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2005/Update/ADU2005PART3.pdf.
[4] British Petroleum (BP), 2007. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2007. BP, London.
[5] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2007. The World Factbook: South Africa.
http://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/sf.html.
[6] Costantini, V., Gracceva, F., Markandya, A., Vicini, G., 2007. Security of Energy Supply;
Comparing Scenarios from a European Perspective. Energy Policy 35 (1), 210-226.
[7] Department of Mineral and Energy (DME), 1998. White Pa-
per on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa.
http://www.dme.gov.za/pdfs/energy/planning/wp_energy_policy_1988.pdf.
[8] ______, 2006. Digest of South African Energy Statistics.
http://www.dme.gov.za/pdfs/energy/planning/2006%20Digest.pdf.
[9] Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy, 2007. Country
Analysis Briefs: South Africa. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_Africa/pdf.pdf.
[10] ________, 2007. International Energy Data and Analysis for South Africa.
http://tonto.eia.doe/gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?￿ps=SF.
[11] European Commission (EC), 2001. Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy
for the Security of Energy Supply. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy- sup-
ply/doc/green_paper_enrrgy_supply_en.pdf.
[12] Fattouh, B., 2007. How Secure Are Middle East Oil Supplies. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
Working Paper No. 33. http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf.
14[13] Fofana, I., Mabugu, R., Chitiga, M., 2008. Analysing Impacts of Alternative Policy Responses
to High Oil Prices Using An Energy Focused CGE Model for South Africa. Report Prepared
for the Financial and Fiscal Commission. Financial and Fiscal Commission, Midrand, South
Africa.
[14] Forfas, 2006. A Baseline Assessment of Ireland￿ s Oil Dependence: Key Policy Considerations.
Forfas, Dublin, Ireland.
[15] Horsnell, P., 2000. The Probability of Oil Market Disruptions With An Emphasis On The
Middle East, in Japanese Energy Security and Changing Global Energy Markets: An Analysis
of Northeast Asian Energy Cooperation and Japan￿ s Evolving Leadership Role in the Region,
James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2000.
[16] International Energy Agency (IEA), 2001. Towards a Sustainable Energy Future. OECD/IEA,
Paris.
[17] Karbuz, S., 2004. Conversion Factors and Oil Statistics. Energy Policy 32(1), 41-45.
[18] ____, 2006. Confessions of a Statistician. Energy Bulletin.
http://www.energybulletin.net/print/php?id=16745
[19] Lesbirel, S.H., 2004. Diversi￿cation and Energy Security Risks: The Japanese Case. Japanese
Journal of Political Science 5(1), 1-22.
[20] Mabro, R., 2001. Transparency in Oil Markets and Other Myths. OIES Monthly Comments,
February 2001.
[21] Saaty, T.L., 1980. The Analytical Hierarchy Process. McGraw-Hill Publications: New York, NY.
[22] _____., 1994. How to Make A Decision: The Analytical Decision Process. Interfaces 24 (6).
[23] South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2007. South African Trade Statistics.
http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=1306.
[24] Wakeford, J.J., 2006. The Impact of Oil Price Shocks on the South African Macroeconomy:
History and Prospects. Paper Prepared for the TIPS/DPRU Forum: Accelerated and Shared
Growth in South Africa: Determinants, Constraints and Opportunities. Johannesburg, 18-20
October 2006. http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/Research Units/DPRU/DPRU Conference.
[25] World Resources Institute. EarthTrends: The Environmental Information Portal.
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_pro￿les/.
[26] Wu, G., Wei, Y.M., Fan, Y., Liu, L.C., 2005. Oil Import Risk Analysis of Main Importers
in the World Based on HHA Approach. Proceedings of 2005 Cross-Straits Energy Economics
Conference, China Taipei.
[27] ____., Wei, Y., Fan, Y., Liu, L., 2007. An Empirical Analysis of the Risk of Crude Oil Imports
in China Using Improved Portfolio Approach. Energy Policy 35 (8) 4190-4199.
[28] Yang, J., Lee, H., 1997. An AHP Decision Model for Facility Location Selection. Facilities 15
(910), 241-254.
[29] Yergin, D., 2006. Ensuring Energy Security. Foreign A⁄airs 85 (2), 69-82.
15Table 1: South Africa’s oil self-sufficiency and intensity of oil use: 1994 - 2006 
 
Year  Oil Self Sufficiency  Intensity of Oil Use 
 
1994 -0.52  0.20 
1995 -0.51  0.20 
1996 -0.51  0.20 
1997 -0.52  0.19 
1998 -0.53  0.20 
1999 -0.58  0.20 
2000 -0.56  0.21 
2001 -0.54  0.21 
2002 -0.56  0.21 
2003 -0.59  0.21 
2004 -0.54  0.20 
2005 -0.56  0.19 
2006 -0.60  0.19 




Table 2: Parameter estimates of the relationship between South Africa’s crude oil import 
prices and Brent spot pricesa 
 
 















Diagnostic tests   
 

















Notes: For parameter estimates, figures in parentheses are t values. d.f. denotes degrees of freedom.   
a Dependent variable: South Africa’s monthly crude oil import price (PS ((t)) 
 
 
Table 3: The risk weight coefficients wk of South Africa’s crude oil import sources 
Region  Africa  Europe   Middle East  North America  Russia  South America  Other 










































1994  8.087 3.08 5.86  8.93  1.19 1.71 3.18 0.72 
1995 17.038  4.19  14.62  18.81  0.82 2.75 2.79 0.86 
1996 14.677  8.39  35.69  44.08  4.20  20.60 6.29 2.43 
1997  23.864 10.89 67.22  78.11 3.01  35.95 5.05 2.82 
1998 21.043  7.25  14.23  21.48  2.24 2.09 4.10 0.68 
1999  19.314 25.53 12.62  38.15  27.59 1.57  15.79 0.65 
2000  18.320 15.55 17.16  32.71 9.24 2.81 9.62 0.94 
2001  18.767 16.16 19.07  35.24  11.01 3.65  10.27 1.02 
2002  16.383 11.69 23.57  35.27 8.11 9.38 7.91 1.44 
2003  17.167 10.50 22.82  33.32 4.91 6.37 6.68 1.33 
2004  23.590 35.21 50.53  85.75  33.14 19.08 16.44  2.14 
2005  17.977 27.89 55.56  83.44  38.45 38.15 18.20  3.09 
2006  21.579 28.94 22.89  51.83  32.45 6.06  14.88 1.06 
2007  16.062 29.89 30.57  60.45  63.72 24.16 17.01  1.90 
 
 
Table 5: Adjusting crude oil imports every month: The impact on systematic risks 
Year  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Real monthly import  Ipst  3.18 2.79 6.29 5.05 4.10  15.79  9.62  10.27  7.91  6.68 16.44 18.20 14.88 17.01 
Average monthly import Ipst  3.13 2.67 6.23 4.65 3.98  15.59  9.64  10.03  7.65  6.64 16.16 17.69 14.19 15.81 




Table 6: Adjusting crude oil imports every month: The impact on specific risks 
Year  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real monthly import  Ipet  0.72 0.86 2.43 2.82 0.68 0.65  0.94 1.02 1.44 1.33 2.14 3.09  1.061 1.90 
Average monthly import Ipet  0.19 0.24 0.65 0.86 0.21 0.18  0.24 0.27 0.44 0.36 0.62 0.88 0.35 0.70 
%  contribution      74.20 74.20 73.34 69.59 69.43 72.64  74.45 73.15 69.59 72.88 70.87 71.45 66.85 63.10 
 
 
Table 7: Transferring import strategies across different regions: The impact on specific risks 
Year  1994 1995 1996  1997  1998 1999  2000  2001 2002  2003 2004 2005  2006  2007 
Real import (Ipet)  0.72 0.86 2.43  2.82  0.68 0.65  0.94  1.02 1.44 1.33 2.14 3.09 1.06 1.90 
Transfer to Africa (Ipet)  0.66 0.78 2.21  2.56  0.61 0.59  0.85 0.92 1.32 1.21  1.97 2.83 0.98 1.78 
% contribution    9.43  9.32  9.24  9.22  9.18 9.02  9.35  9.08 8.27  8.90 8.18 8.59  7.85 6.30 
Transfer to Europe  0.65  0.77  2.19  2.54  0.61 0.59  0.84  0.92 1.30  1.20 1.94 2.79  0.96 1.73 
% contribution    9.43  9.82  9.88  9.69  9.85 9.85  9.90  9.86 9.65  9.83 9.66 9.77  9.53 8.88 
Transfer to North America  0.65  0.77  2.19  2.54  0.61 0.59  0.84  0.92 1.30  1.20 1.94 2.79  0.96 1.74 
% contribution    9.43  9.81  9.81  9.68  9.56 9.73  9.82  9.79 9.61  9.76 9.58 9.69  9.46 8.81 
Transfer to Russia  0.65  0.77  2.19  2.55  0.61 0.59  0.84  0.92 1.30  1.20 1.94 2.79  0.96 1.74 
% contribution    9.43  9.81  9.81  9.60  9.74 9.76  9.82  9.79 9.52  9.76 9.58 9.69  9.43 8.58 
Transfer to South America  0.65  0.77  2.19  2.54  0.61 0.59  0.85  0.92 1.30  1.20 1.94 2.79  0.96 1.74 
% contribution    9.43  9.74  9.74  9.71  9.56 9.71  9.75  9.72 9.54  9.69 9.51 9.62  9.36 8.68 
Transfer to Other  0.65  0.77  2.19  2.54  0.61 0.59  0.84  0.92 1.30  1.20 1.94 2.79  0.96 1.74 





Figure 1: Energy intensity for selected middle-income countries in 2003
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Figure 2: Per capita oil consumption for selected middle-income countries in 2007 
 





















bbl/day per 1000 persons
 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2007). 
Note: This measure is based on total oil consumed in barrels per day (bbl/day). The discrepancy between the amount of oil 
produced and/or imported and the amount consumed and/or exported is due to omission of stock changes, refinery 
gains and other factors.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Energy intensity is calculated as the ratio of a country’s total energy consumption to GDP. It reflects the primary 
amount of energy used per unit of income generated by a country’s economy. The primary amount of energy 
includes coal and coal products, oil and petroleum products, natural gas, nuclear power, hydroelectric power and 
biofuels. Using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates, GDP is converted to international dollars and rescaled to 
2000 to give a common reference year (World Resources Institute, 2007).   
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Trade Statistics of SARS (2007).  
Note: The terms Middle East, Africa and Other are collective names of the geographical location of South Africa’s major oil 
supplying partners. The Middle East covers the following countries: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates 
Yemen, Iraq, Oman and Qatar. The African region comprises Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Cameroon. The term “other” 








Figure 5: Diversification index of South Africa’s crude oil imports: 1994 – 2007 
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Figure 6: Trend in South African monthly crude oil import prices and the monthly Brent 











20Figure 7: The systematic risk, specific risk and the total portfolio risk for South Africa’s 
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Figure 8: The systematic and specific risk index of South Africa’s crude oil imports for 
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Figure 9: The relationship between the diversification index and the specific risk index of 
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Figure 10:  The change in risk index based on transferring import strategies for the 
period 1994-2007 
6
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Figure 11:  The changes in risk index due to different strategy adjustments in South 
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Application of the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) in deriving 
the Import Risk Weights for South Africa’s Crude Oil Suppliers 
 
AHP has been used in a wide variety of complex decision-making problems, such 
as the strategic planning of organisational resources (Saaty, 1994), the evaluation of 
strategic alternatives (Yang and Lee, 1997), and the justification of new manufacturing 
technology (Albayrakoglu, 1996). The first step of the AHP process is to develop a 
decision hierarchy model that evaluates the decision-making problem on the basis of the 
components of the problem, namely: (i) the goal or focus, (ii) objectives or criteria, and 
(iii) the alternatives. 
For the goal of achieving improved South Africa’s crude oil imports security risk, 
the strategy is to diversify the crude imports among a list of identified supply regions 
(termed alternatives),  where the diversification strategy is based on how well the 
alternatives rate against a chosen set of criteria or objectives. These objectives include: (a) 
geopolitical factors (such as the potential for supply sources in certain regions to suffer from 
militant attacks, external invasion, civil unrest, strikes, and tense relations with oil trading 
partners); (b) investment policies governing the oil sector of the supply country (for example 
prohibition of foreign investment or the nationalisation of oil resources); and (c) export 
policy of supply nations (such as being members of OPEC). Figure A1 outlines a 
hierarchical ranking of these different criteria and how they interact. The criteria are 
weighted in terms of importance to the decision maker with the overall “score” of an 
alternative measured as the weighted sum of its rating against each criterion (objective). 
 
Figure A1: A Decision hierarchy model for selecting South Africa’s Crude Oil Imports 




To allow for decision makers’ uncertainties, Saaty (1980) utilises a scale of values 
that allows the qualitative judgments of comparison to be translated into quantitative 
terms (see Table A1). This scale of relative importance covers an interval of values 
between 1 (equal importance of aspects) and 9 (extreme importance of one over the 
other). The reciprocal values of the precedents are also defined so that if, for example, a 
23preference intensity of 3 is assigned to an aspect compared to another aspect, then the 
latter has a preference intensity that is the inverse of the first (1/3) (see Table A1).  
 
Table A1: Scale of Comparative Judgment and the Numerical Equivalent 
Definition Intensity 
Absolutely the most important  9 
Much more important  7 
More Important  5 
Slightly more important  3 
Equal Importance  1 
Slightly less important  1/3 
Less Important  1/5 
Much less Important  1/7 
Absolutely less Important  1/9 
Source: Saaty (1980).  
Note: Intermediate values 2,4,6,8 are used to represent compromise between preferences. 
 
To determine the relative importance (weights) of each criterion (i.e., geopolitical, 
investment and OPEC memberships) to the total crude oil import risk in South Africa, 
we design a pairwise comparison matrix, (Table A2), with each criteria weighted in terms 
of its relative importance to the decision maker. 
 
Table A2: Sample Pairwise Comparison Matrix (A) for the criteria in terms of importance 
to decision makers’ Judgment 
 
Criteria  Geopolitical Investment  OPEC 
Geopolitical(g)  1  3  7 
Investment(l) 1/3  1  5 
OPEC(o) 1/7  1/5  1 
 
An intensity of 3 implies that geopolitical factors have slightly more important 
impact on crude oil import risks than foreign investment policies, and has a much more 
important impact (intensity of 7) when compared to OPEC Membership of supply 
regions. To obtain criteria weights, we use the Eigen-vector method (Aw=λw), where A 
represents the comparison matrix (Table A2), w = (g, l, o) is the criteria weights vector 
(normalized to sum to 1) and λ is the maximum Eigen value, approximately equal to 3. A 
consistency ratio that indicates whether or not there are significant contradictions in the 
pairwise comparison values is also calculated. The consistency ratio should be less than 
or equal to 0.10 to accept the calculated weights. If the consistency ratio is greater than 
0.10, the decision maker is inconsistent in making comparative judgments among the 
criteria and has to derive another set of pairwise comparison values.  
Next, for each criterion, we define a matrix of pairwise comparison values of the 
alternative suppliers relative to their importance to criteria. For example, Table A3 shows 
the pairwise comparison values of supply sources in terms of importance to geopolitical 
factors. Similar pairwise comparison values are generated for criteria of foreign 
investment and OPEC membership.   
 
 
Table A3: Sample Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the supply regions in terms of 
importance to geopolitical factors 
     Middle  North      South 
24Africa Europe east America Others Russia America
Africa (gA)   1   4    1/2 4   4   3   2  
Europe (gE)   1/4  1    1/5 1   1    1/2   1/3
Middle east (gM)   2   5   1   5   5   4   3  
 North America(gN)   1/4  1    1/5 1   1    1/2   1/3
Others(gO)   1/4  1    1/5 1   1    1/2   1/3
Russia(gR)   1/3  2    1/4 2   2   1    1/2
 South America (gS)   1/2  3    1/3 3   3   2   1  
 
In relation to geopolitical criteria (Table A3), Middle East (gM) is rated more 
important (intensity of 5) compared to Europe, North America and Others; slightly more 
important (intensity of 3) than South America, and almost of equal importance (intensity 
of 2) with Africa. Geopolitical related weights for supply regions are then obtained by 
applying the Eigen-vector method: (Ag=λg), where A  represents the pairwise 
comparison matrix (Table A3), g= (gA, gE, gM, gN, gO, gR, gS) is the weights vector and λ is 
the maximum Eigen value, which should be approximately equal to 7. If the calculated 
consistence index is beyond 0.10, then the decision maker is not consistent in his 
comparisons and has to design a more consistent pairwise comparison matrix. Similarly, 
investment related weights: l = (lA, lE, lM, lN, lO, lR, lS) and export policy (OPEC membership) 
related weights o = (oA, oE, oM, oN, oO, oR, oS) are generated.  
Lastly, the overall “score” of each alternative supplier source is calculated as the 
weighted sum of its rating against each criterion (objective). For example, the overall 
score or risk incurred by sourcing crude oil from Africa  equals (gA*g) + (lA*l) + (oA*o) 
(see Table A4). 
 
Table A4: Calculation of Crude oil Supply Source Risk Weights 
Geopolitical Investment OPEC  
Regions’ 
Risk weights 
Criteria Weights   g l  o 
Supply Source     
Africa   gA l A o A  (gA*g) + (lA*l) + (oA*o) 
Europe   gE l E o E  (gE*g) + (lE*l) + (oE*o) 
Middle east   gM l M o M  (gM*g) + (lM*l) + (oM*o) 
 North America gN l N o N  (gN*g) + (lN*l) + (oN*o) 
Others gO l O o O  (gO*g) + (lO*l) + (oO*o) 
Russia gR l R o R  (gR*g) + (lR*l) + (oR*o) 
 South America gS l S o S  (gS*g)  + (lS*l) + (oS*o) 
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